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In popular music lyrics the banana symbolizes exotic and erotic pleasure. El único 
fruto del amor, es la banana, es la banana, el único fruto del amor, es la banana 
de mi amor sings one of the popular song lines. After Josephine Baker got dressed 
up in a banana skirt for a provocative photo in 1928, many other ‘banana babes’ 
would follow in a similar suit. In the 1940s the famously seductive ‘Miss Chiquita’ 
was created and in the late 1950s Chiquita used the banana’s imagined eroticism in 
an advertisement that pictured the proper size of a Chiquita banana and linked it 
symbolically to a marine’s sexual apparatus. Scholars studying the banana sector, 
however, mainly focus on the dark side of the banana. Choosing between love and 
war, historians and other social scientists and activists have preferred the metaphor 
of war for their book titles. Early uses of the ‘Banana War’ metaphor refer to USA 
intervention in the Caribbean and Mexico (Langley) or the fight between banana 
companies in Honduras over the right to control supply from contract farmers 
(Carías 1991). The concept became particularly lively in 1998 when a wave of lead 
story news items reported the Clinton administration’s steps to apply tariffs to im-
ported EU products in retaliation for trade protection policies on bananas. Titles of 
scientific books apparently like to appropriate such strong media images. 
 This essay reviews a set of books that have applied battleground metaphors to 
the world of banana production and trade. A comparative reading of these books 
about various banana wars provides an opportunity to identify the range of contra-
dictions and tensions and the nature of the battlefields in which banana production 
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and trade in Latin America has evolved. 
 The power of banana corporations and the history of conflicts in Latin America 
may have inspired authors to employ the war metaphor. A handful of capitalists, in 
ambiguous relationships with workers, peasants, labour organizations, national 
governments, and consumers, transformed the banana into a fully global commod-
ity in the early twentieth century. Many governments conceived export banana 
production as promising for economic and social modernization. Banana exports 
required the construction of railways, modern harbours, modern communication 
systems, and electrification. These entrepreneurs not only transformed their com-
panies into multinational corporations, but also dramatically altered the political, 
economic, cultural and natural landscapes of numerous Latin American and Carib-
bean regions (Striffler and Moberg 2003). The United Fruit Company (Chiquita) in 
particular has been portrayed as a model of corporate globalization in the food sec-
tor because it once controlled 80 to 90 per cent of banana imports into the USA. 
But even this company was never an omnipotent institution. The management was 
often divided over strategy, and company policies were frequently inconsistent 
with the pursuit of long-term corporate interests (Bourgois in Striffler and Moberg 
2003, Striffler 2002, Moberg in Striffler and Moberg 2003). 
The capital – labour war 
One key contradiction, that between capital and labour, is the core topic of the 
more historical works of Striffler, and Striffler and Moberg. Accounts of extremely 
repressive forms of labour control as well as more conciliatory approaches are pre-
sented. An example of the former is given in Forster’s analysis of Guatemala of the 
1940s (Forster in Striffler and Moberg 2003). Workers’ grievances at United 
Fruit’s plantations had long been repressed by ‘exhaustion and fear, the distractions 
of drink, and the company’s facile manipulation of temporary contracts with indi-
vidual workers’ (p. 203). This situation was analysed by the Communist Party as 
‘fruitful’ for organizing workers, and during a changing political context after the 
fall of President Jorge Ubico in 1944, labour mobilized with extraordinary speed to 
coalesce modern union and anti-imperialist sentiments. 
 Striffler argues that the United Fruit Company drew lessons from the Central 
American labour conflicts and adopted a more conciliatory approach in Hacienda 
Tenguel, its banana enclave in Ecuador in the 1950s. The Tengelueños quoted in 
Striffler’s book express glowing impressions of the company. In a context of rela-
tively low labour costs in the Ecuadorian economy as well as an Ecuadorian politi-
cal landscape of populist-nationalist forces that kept the company’s more egregious 
excesses in check, the company established a system of management and discipline 
that included high wages and exceptional benefits (health care, good hospitals, 
high quality housing including electricity, subsidized food including milk and 
meat, social clubs, sponsorship of sport clubs, and so on), which reflected consid-
erable paternalism. Workers who did not follow the rules set by the company about 
how to behave in the plantation, in the house, and in the social space were fired and 
removed by the company’s police force from the area. This remote area was only 
accessible by means of boat or train transport owned and policed by the company. 
 This regime, however, could only be maintained under specific conditions 
(high profits, little competition over resources) and was challenged, first, by land-
hungry peasants who occupied land at the fringes of the enclave and, later, by laid-
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off company workers who took over the core part of Hacienda Tenguel in the early 
1960s. Land occupations together with Panama disease, a fungous disease of ba-
nanas, were major factors that caused United Fruit to withdraw from direct produc-
tion and to source banana production through emerging local capitalists. At the 
same time, populist state officials and various state departments supported worker 
organizations and cooperatives as part of an emerging land reform discourse. The 
labour union renamed itself as a cooperative in order to align its struggle with this 
new discourse. It successfully controlled the enclave for a time, waiting for further 
action by the state to restructure the production system. Meanwhile, Castro’s take-
over of power in Cuba had mobilized elites in Latin America, and an ideological 
war was evolving between organized worker-peasant movements and capital. El-
ites phrased the confrontation in terms of ‘organized anarchy provoked by commu-
nism’ versus ‘order’. A national shift in Ecuador from populism to militarism led 
to a military takeover of Tenguel to root out ‘the clandestine agents of commu-
nism’ and to redefine the agrarian reform programme in Ecuador by focussing on 
private property, order and increased production. Hinted at by Striffler, but not 
fully developed in his book, is the effect of the emerging Cold War and its influ-
ence on the ideological struggle between labour and capital. Organized banana 
workers in various Latin American countries, when demanding local improvements 
of labour conditions or livelihood security, were increasingly confronted by mili-
tary repression. Acts of repression often took place after a campaign of ideological 
agitation in the media in which a labour organization was nailed down as commu-
nist. Previously contented labourers had supposedly been misled by outside agita-
tors. Similar patterns have been documented elsewhere (see Barahona 1994 for 
Honduras, and Forster in Striffler and Moberg 2003 for Guatemala). 
 A key issue related to this kind of struggle is the historically ambivalent role of 
the state as a mediating actor between labour and capital. On the one hand, states 
promote agricultural development and the build-up of infrastructure (ports, railway 
networks, roads, telegraph), which was particularly interwoven with state forma-
tion in the smaller countries (see Posas and Del-Cid 1981); this led in many cases 
(Striffler 2002, Moberg in Striffler and Moberg 2003) to administrations that re-
pressed opposition to this project. On the other hand, administrations, or agencies 
within the state, supported popular demands and allowed or even stimulated the 
formation of labour organizations and ex-worker co-operatives. Striffler describes 
how peasant movements in southern Ecuador, shifting over time, developed differ-
ent alliances in sections within the central, regional and local state, and thus 
avoided being evicted from their squatted land. In this process the peasants became 
increasingly dependent on the state, and their struggles contributed to state forma-
tion and the restructuring of state-peasant relationships. Government support for 
popular demand could lead to foreign interventions such as in the infamous case of 
the CIA-arranged coup that deposed President Jacobo Arbenz in 1954, after the 
Arbenz administration in Guatemala had expropriated more than 200,000 acres of 
United Fruit company land (95 per cent of which was unused at that time) (Taylor 
and Scharlin). In Ecuador, Striffler outlines how land-invading peasants were well 
aware of the non-homogeneous character of the state and the changes taking place, 
and how they used these differences and changes to build new alliances during 
their protracted struggle with the United Fruit Company. 
 Although states sometimes supported worker organizations, they mostly did not 
object to vertical control of production by larger entrepreneurs. Only the Caribbean 
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has offered a ‘quite different model of state engagement’ (Wells in Striffler and 
Moberg 2003). In the Windward Islands, the British colonial administration re-
sisted United Fruit’s efforts to control trade through its then subsidiary Fyffes. The 
state regulated marketing channels and organized technical assistance instead of 
leaving it to the multinationals, and as a result, smallholders stayed in the banana 
business (Grossman in Striffler and Moberg 2003). 
The shaping of identity while enforcing particular labour relationships 
Not only do historical studies identify the struggle between capital and labour 
about employment and land, they also explore the importance of the shaping of 
particular identities. Striffler analyses how United Fruit made use of gender images 
to discipline the labour force in Tenguel. Only married men who brought their 
families were selected to be hired as workers.1 The company instructed women 
how to maintain the home at a level of cleanliness required by the company’s rigid 
standards, and urged them to participate in church, school, and other community 
activities. Male workers who did not maintain their families could lose their job or 
home, and if a man abused his wife or children, he was punished. 
 Other authors (such as Bourgois in Striffler and Moberg 2003) point at other 
forms of playing with identities, such as ‘the managerial manipulation of the ethnic 
composition of the labour force’. Euraque (in Striffler and Moberg 2003) argues 
that the so-called banana enclaves on the northern Caribbean coast of Honduras 
were intricately linked with national economic and political history. The author 
asks why the Honduran congress in 1926 voted to name the country’s national cur-
rency after Lempira, an indigenous chieftain who died fighting the Spaniards in the 
1530s. According to Euraque, Lempira’s racialization is part of an emerging Indo-
Hispanic mestizaje. Honduran intellectuals felt threatened by USA-government 
imperialism and were alarmed by the economic development of the banana en-
claves where black Garifuna were employed by the companies. These intellectuals 
established a mestizo identity that ‘memorialized a romantic-nationalist indigenous 
myth that included Lempira as defender of sovereignty and autonomy against ex-
ternal threat’ (p. 247). They denied that most black workers were Garifuna, and 
instead labelled all black workers as West Indians brought to the country by the 
fruit companies. A series of articles published in the 1910s and ’20s declared the 
‘danger of racial mixture’. Political parties and labour unions proposed and sup-
ported various racist immigration laws. The tension between national political in-
tellectuals and the growing influence of USA capital on the Honduran political 
economy translated into viewing black populations, especially the Garifuna, as a 
menace to the newly reinvented Indian/Spanish national identity. According to 
Euraque, the economic and ethnic history of the banana enclaves led to a redefini-
tion of national identities. 
 Soluri (in Striffler and Moberg 2003) takes up another identity issue. It is not 
related to production but to the area of consumption. Within a very short period 
bananas became a product of mass consumption in the USA and shaped cultural 
meanings linked to humour, zaniness, and sexuality. When high import duties on 
bananas were announced in 1913, consumer representatives together with the ba-
nana industry protested successfully. They claimed it was the most widely con-
sumed fruit among the urban poor, thus contrasting it with the aristocratic tradi-
tions associated with the consumption of other tropical commodities such as tea, 
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coffee, and chocolate. American poems and songs associated bananas with sensual 
women, a theme exploited in the immensely successful advertising campaign fea-
turing ‘Miss Chiquita’. But USA popular discourse has also linked the fruit to dark, 
bumbling, lazy, non-English-speaking people and called the tropics ‘primitive’. 
This image was also generated by the multinational companies when they argued 
that the exotic banana comes from tropical places ‘in which nature’s fecundity 
sapped the initiative of the residents’, thus making a case for the need for USA 
investment and entrepreneurship. 
 The most discussed identity issue, however, remains the shaping of worker, 
union, and peasant identity of the labourers on the banana plantations. Interesting is 
Forster’s attention to the struggle of United Fruit’s plantations in Guatemala in the 
1940s about the classification of different workers and who was allowed to union-
ize. The company tried to declare supervisors, captains, foremen and timekeepers 
(who clocked the workers’ hours) as ‘confidential employees’ who were not al-
lowed to be active in the union, while the union argued that these supervisors were 
the most exposed to the injustices of the higher level managers. Such classifica-
tions and restrictions concerning labour organization are still a source of contention 
in some countries today. 
 Taylor and Scharlin discuss another form of the banana companies’ involve-
ment in constraining workers’ identification with union organizations. At the time 
of the Sandinist socialist experiment in Nicaragua, the CIA and conservative forces 
pressured the government in Costa Rica to follow an anti-union strategy just like in 
Honduras, the other neighbour of Nicaragua. This strategy included blacklisting, 
police storming of union offices, and a fierce propaganda campaign linking union-
ism with terrorism and the communist movement. Simultaneously, the Solidarity 
Association, an alternative labour organization that represented workers’ griev-
ances, was set up in a collaborative effort with the Catholic Church, the govern-
ment, and the American embassy. The formation of this particular Costa Rican 
institution led to a major setback for conventional union organizations on the ba-
nana plantations. 
The capital - capital war 
Relationships between capital and labour evolve in relation to the competition be-
tween different forms of capital. Production locations with the worst labour condi-
tions and lowest pay set the baseline against which other competitors must compete 
in the market. Currently five big traders dominate a highly oligopolistic market, 
jointly operating about 86 per cent of the world trade of dessert bananas: Chiquita, 
Dole, Del Monte, Fyffes, and Noboa (an Ecuadorian company). If we examine the 
different forms of competition, at least three different major battlegrounds can be 
identified. 
Battleground 1: the balance between domestic capital and international capital 
The companies that later would turn into large banana multinationals started as 
traders buying from local growers. In the early twentieth century these trading 
companies shifted to direct production in order to guarantee a continuous supply of 
bananas of a predefined quality.  
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 Historically, many governments have tried to support the development of spe-
cific economic sectors and the growth of domestic capital by seeking foreign in-
vestments. For example, in colonial Belize, governors looked for alternatives for 
the declining timber industry and sought to create a politically conservative sector 
of small and medium-sized farmers by making arrangements with an international 
trader to set up export banana production (Moberg in Striffler and Moberg 2003). 
To attract the United Fruit Company, various governors made generous conces-
sions and subsidies on behalf of its steamship operations, invested in railway con-
struction to connect new company plantations with a port, and guaranteed low 
prices to be paid to their suppliers. Local growers contested the land prices defined 
by the state, which were higher for local growers than for the company. Despite the 
initial desire of the colonial administration to support an emerging class of domes-
tic growers, its general support for agricultural development specifically benefited 
the multinational company. Moberg refutes claims of the local critics of those days 
that the British officials acted on behalf of United Fruit due to corruption and fear 
of a USA intervention. He shows that, to the contrary, the agricultural development 
policies tied to export markets compelled the government to deal with the corpora-
tion that controlled those markets. The Belize case study reveals two major strate-
gies to push domestic capital out of the market or to subsume them to corporate 
capital. One strategy was to limit access to land for competing growers. By 1930, 
United Fruit had procured over twenty times the amount of land it held under ac-
tual cultivation. Company critics have argued that this strategy limited the avail-
ability of land to competitors. A second strategy concerned not the monopolization 
of production but the monopolization of trade. Sometimes United Fruit even paid 
growers higher prices than its competitors could afford, thus depriving rivals of 
marketable fruit. 
 While in some historical contexts international corporations tended to eliminate 
domestic competitors, in other contexts they may have supported domestic capital 
investments as a way to get back in into banana production. Altered conditions in 
Latin America by the mid-twentieth century obliged the United Fruit Company to 
confront increasingly assertive workers, less compliant national officials, and 
growing demands from would-be landowners (Bucheli in Striffler and Moberg 
2003). Workers became better organized, land reform discourses became dominant 
and populist governments won elections, or populist discourses captured the 
imagination of young military putschists. Furthermore, Panama disease became 
very difficult to control. At the same time domestic growers were equably able to 
produce a similar quality of banana as the companies themselves. These factors 
together induced a shift away from direct production to a system of contract farm-
ing (Striffler). When United Fruit faced difficulties in maintaining its existing sys-
tem of production in Hacienda Tenguel in the late 1950s to early ’60s, it first ex-
perimented with various contracts with different types of contract farmers: peasant 
producers, former managers who had rented part of the plantations, tenants, ex-
workers’ co-operatives, and large domestic capitalists.  
 To date we can still see a variety of contract forms in different countries. Con-
tract farming makes it possible for the companies to source bananas without taking 
production risks (such as those related to weather and pests), the risk of expropria-
tion, and the necessity of labour surveillance. At the same time, the contracts make 
it possible to set quality standards and to organize supply at the right time (see 
Grossman 1998). In return, growers may get a more or less guaranteed market, 
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access to inputs, and access to technical assistance (for example, Dole does the 
aerial pesticide spraying for its contract growers in Honduras; Jansen 2004). How-
ever, the contract system has been criticized for its asymmetrical bargaining rela-
tionship in shifting production risks from large corporations to smaller developing 
country growers, and shifting the burden of cost reduction onto the shoulders of the 
worker through poor labour conditions and suppressed labour organizations (an 
issue currently being heavily debated in the Ecuadorian situation). Another issue of 
contention in contract farming schemes is the arbitrary and unfair grading, such as 
the use of grading standards as an apparently neutral tool to regulate supply. 
 In some cases the state has regulated the contract system in order to support 
domestic smallholders, to keep them in the market, and to link them to global 
commodity chains. In St. Vincent, the state together with the Banana Growers’ 
Association organized a guaranteed market by establishing contracts with shipping 
companies and setting grading standards, and making these more stringent over 
time (Grossman in Striffler and Moberg 2003). A part of the profits were rein-
vested in development projects in the producers’ communities. The association was 
also involved in restructuring the sector to eliminate less-productive farmers. How-
ever, as we will see below, the Windward Islands banana sector has become the 
first major loser of the international banana trade dispute. The dual role of the as-
sociation, as central buyer/coordinator in a contract farming enterprise and as an 
institution concerned with development, has now gravitated to efficiency and re-
structuring as a consequence of the battle between the giants. 
Battleground 2: the fierce competition between the Goliaths 
When competition between large banana corporations leads to conflictive situa-
tions, the Banana War metaphor easily pops up. The competition between Fyffes 
(sourcing bananas in Jamaica) and Geest (sourcing in the Windward Islands) over 
their UK market share became so fierce in the early 1960s that this battle was 
called a Banana War (Anderson et al. in Josling and Taylor 2003). In the early 
1990s, Fyffes intended to source bananas in Honduras, basically from growers who 
had contracts with Chiquita. Fyffes offered higher prices, but Chiquita blocked 
Fyffes by using legal manoeuvres to sustain its contractual monopoly (Carías 1991, 
Taylor in Josling and Taylor 2003) and mobilizing state support to the extent that 
bananas were once forcibly unloaded from Fyffes’ ships under military control 
(Myers). States tend to get involved in banana production and trade due to the eco-
nomic importance of banana production for some countries. States shape the fights 
between the Goliaths.  
 Monopolies or the absence of competition, i.e. the result of effective competi-
tion, have also been addressed by more powerful states in order to protect con-
sumer interests. The once almost absolute monopoly of the United Fruit Company 
was turned, historically, into an oligopoly by USA public intervention. As a result 
of successive anti-trust actions, United Fruit had to divest assets out of which Dole 
and Del Monte developed.2 After a congressional inquiry in the USA in 1908, fol-
lowing complaints by a competitor of abuses in Panama and Costa Rica, United 
Fruit voluntarily sold off a subsidiary, the Vaccaro Brothers Company, which be-
came Standard Fruit and subsequently Dole. In spite of this divestment United 
Fruit remained a giant corporation. By 1954 it owned or controlled 85 per cent of 
the land in the American tropics suitable for banana cultivation (Myers). However, 
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new antitrust suits in the 1950s threatened its operations in Guatemala and forced it 
to part with some of its activities there. But the pressure continued and in 1972 the 
company sold off most of its Guatemalan interests to the Del Monte Corporation 
(Taylor and Scharlin), transforming the latter into the third largest banana exporter. 
Del Monte, a fruit and vegetable marketer, had entered the banana sector only a 
few years earlier, through the acquisition of the West Indies Fruit Company, in 
order to block the United Fruit Company’s apparent takeover attempt (United Fruit 
had bought a 6 per cent interest in Del Monte in 1967) (Taylor, in Josling and Tay-
lor 2003). 
 Public intervention in the banana business did not stop at breaking up monopo-
lies. Recent actions of the WTO, the global-level public arena for regulating ‘free 
trade’, redefined the terms of competition between corporations. Chiquita, which 
was in an economically difficult position in the early 1990s, used its political con-
nections with the White House – built up by supporting election campaigns of both 
Democratic and Republican presidential candidates – to engage the USA admini-
stration in an international trade conflict (Stovall and Hathaway in Josling and 
Taylor 2003). Chiquita had lost some of its market share in Europe due to the 
European quota system for bananas, which will be discussed below. Precisely be-
cause of this quota system, strongly contested by Chiquita, banana prices in the EU 
were often higher than the average world market price; thus the highest profits 
could be made in Europe. Dole and, to a lesser extent, Del Monte profited from 
Chiquita’s difficult financial position in the early 1990s, and were more astute in 
anticipating EU regulations in taking over import companies and ripeners, thereby 
obtaining licenses formerly controlled by Chiquita, and in expanding their market 
shares in Europe at the cost of Chiquita (Myers, Josling in Josling and Taylor 
2003, Kasteele 1998, Taylor in Josling and Taylor 2003). Initially, Dole did not 
object to the efforts of the USA administration in getting the EU banana regime 
revised. But when the USA rejected a EU proposal for a new licensing system in 
2001 that was desired by Dole, the company reacted bitterly, pointing at the USA 
government policy favouring only the interests of one particular company: Chi-
quita (Brenes and Madrigal in Josling and Taylor 2003, Stovall and Hathaway in 
Josling and Taylor 2003). In short, the most recent Banana War can be read as a 
conflict between companies. But it was much more. It was also a political eco-
nomic struggle between countries and between the ideologies of the ‘free market’ 
versus ‘managed trade’. 
Battleground 3: diverging national interests and political and ideological  
struggles over the possibilities of free trade and managed trade 
At the heart of the WTO ‘Banana War’ lay the diverging interests of different 
countries: countries like Honduras and Guatemala with a strong presence of multi-
national companies, countries like Ecuador with many more medium-sized produc-
ers and domestic capital driving the banana business, the Windward Islands with 
small farmers and state-supported co-operatives, countries within the EU that de-
fend their own overseas territories and post-colonial dependencies, countries within 
the EU that merely consume bananas and strive to lower consumer prices (Tan-
germann in Josling and Taylor 2003), the USA that defends particular business 
interests and a specific interpretation of WTO agreements, African ACP countries 
that intend to expand their banana exports, and so on. The WTO-related Banana 
Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe 81, octubre de 2006 | 105 
 
War originated from colonial trade relations formed in the early twentieth century. 
Myers describes the support of the Imperial Economic Committee of the United 
Kingdom for producers from Jamaica and other Commonwealth countries through 
the establishment of a system of protective tariffs from the 1920s. The UK had a 
strong interest in buying ‘sterling bananas’ rather than ‘dollar bananas’ in order to 
sustain the pound sterling in times of debt crisis. A licensing and quota system 
gave preference to importers that shipped the sterling bananas from the Caribbean. 
Nevertheless, the imported volumes were low, keeping consumer prices high, and 
the sterling bananas from Jamaica and the Windward Islands especially were of a 
relatively poor quality. The protective arrangements were maintained in spite of 
various parties, such as importers that could not get licenses, demanding a move to 
a system of free trade,. Even the Thatcher administration saw little alternative. Ba-
nana exports to the UK had become crucial for economic survival, particularly for 
the Windward Islands, where small farmers on hilly land could not compete with 
the prices of bananas from vast plantations operated on a industrial basis in Latin 
America. 
 UK protection of Commonwealth producers concurred with the EU protection 
of producers in the Spanish Canary Islands, the French-controlled regions in Mar-
tinique and Guadeloupe, Madeira (Portugal) and Greece, as well as with the con-
solidation of post-colonial relationships between European countries and the ACP 
countries institutionalized by the Lomé Convention (particularly important were 
the relationships between France and Cameroon and Ivory Coast, and to a lesser 
extent between Italy and Somalia). Costa Rica, Colombia, and Guatemala chal-
lenged the different quota systems of European countries in the GATT but ac-
cepted the Banana Framework Agreement effective on 1 January 1995, which as-
signed each country a given export share under a fixed tariff rate for the surplus. 
The agreement was favourable to Colombia and Costa Rica, but unfavourable to 
Ecuador and Panama (Brenes and Madrigal in Josling and Taylor 2003, Myers 
2004). Another result of the Banana Framework Agreement and the subsequent 
turmoil of negotiations was to replace the quota systems of individual EU countries 
by a complex EU system of licenses and certificates. A market for import licenses 
and export certificates soon came into being. Brenes and Madrigal argue that much 
of the banana trade in the 1990s, a period with low world-market prices, is associ-
ated with rents accruing to EU policies and this market of licenses. 
 One company did not seem to profit from the EU banana regime. Chiquita ar-
gued that it incurred huge losses in the early 1990s due to the quota system in the 
EU. Its view would coincide with the view of the USA government that feared that 
the EU’s Lomé commitments were detrimental to USA commercial interests 
(Myers). The first GATT panels started in 1993 when several Latin American 
countries tried to alter the European banana regime. Several rounds of complaints, 
panels, reports, and appellations would follow thereafter. The battleground became 
particularly heated when the USA entered this arena in 1996, which was an elec-
tion year in the USA. The story of the different cases and rulings before the WTO 
is told in detail by Josling (in Josling and Taylor 2003) and Myers. Josling pro-
vides a concise overview of the different panels, reports and rulings. The political 
importance of the banana dispute went far beyond the banana trade as its subject 
matter – preferential access for an export crop from former colonies – epitomized 
the tensions between modulated decolonization and non-discriminatory multilater-
alism. Furthermore, one of the complaints was brought to the first GATS panel, the 
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new General Agreement on Trade in Services, and this was considered as a means 
to clarify the relationship between the rules for the goods trade (GATT) and those 
for the trade in services (GATS). Moreover, the banana dispute tested the newly 
enhanced Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO, a key concern for the 
USA and an issue in its domestic political arena. The banana case became a politi-
cally sensitive issue for the WTO, with two core players as adversaries, the EU and 
the USA, and the constructed image of a superpower manipulating the WTO to 
destroy the traditional exports of small island economies in the Caribbean and poor 
African countries in the favour of a few USA based multinational banana produc-
ers (Josling in Josling and Taylor 2003). 
 Myers’ account of the trade dispute is particularly interesting because the au-
thor describes in detail the many different steps made by different actors as well as 
the views of these actors at various moments in the process. Quite instructive is his 
account of what happened in the negotiation rooms and corridors. He describes 
how the ACP countries that had a high stake in the regulation of the banana market 
were kept outside the process and accorded only third-party status. The WTO panel 
regarded the dispute as exclusively between the USA and the four Latin American 
complainants (Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico, and Ecuador) on one side and the 
EU on the other. Myers clearly writes from a committed insider view, but with 
enough writer’s distance:  
The ACP countries were not allowed to attend the organizational meetings, 
which decided on issues affecting the conduct of the case; they were allowed to 
attend only selected sessions and to make a ‘brief statement’. They were denied 
the right to pose questions to the Complainants or the EU on factual and legal 
matters or to submit rebuttals to their submissions. Moreover, they did not re-
ceive copies of the panel’s report when it was sent to the complainants and the 
European Community for vetting, but only after it had been published. Worst of 
all, the panel chairman, at the request of the complainants, ejected from the ses-
sions the two private lawyers advising the Windward Islands delegations. These 
lawyers had been formally accredited in writing by the Windward Islands gov-
ernments as members of their delegations. But at the organizational meeting, to 
which the third parties were not admitted, it had been intimated that only mem-
bers of government would be present at panel meetings. This was interpreted as 
meaning permanent government employees. So the four Windward Islands 
were left without legal advice during these crucial sessions, facing the serried 
ranks of permanent legal advisers of the USA and other complainants. Two 
main justifications were offered for this extraordinary action. One was that pri-
vate lawyers could not be trusted to maintain confidentiality in the same way as 
civil servants; the other was that the practice of bringing private lawyers ‘would 
entail disproportionately large financial burdens’ for smaller countries. The im-
plication that it is more economic to employ full-time permanent legal experts 
on the GATT rather than to hire them on the very rare occasions that they are 
needed is hard to follow. To add insult to injury, the chairman subsequently re-
buked the delegations concerned for breach of confidentiality when the story of 
the ejection appeared in the press (p. 89-90).  
Myers thus provides another level of detail compared to the more distant, formal 
account of Josling, who states simply: ‘Private lawyers were, however, banned 
from the proceedings to preserve the intergovernmental nature of the dispute set-
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tlement process’ (Josling in Josling and Taylor 2003, 178). 
 After a seven-year banana trade war, pacification set in when the EU and the 
USA came to an agreement in 2001. After a transition period of several years, the 
EU banana regime would shift to a ‘tariff-only’ system as of 1 January 2006, 
which established a flat-rate tariff for all bananas, except for a zero-duty rate for 
775,000 tonnes ACP bananas under a ‘most favoured nation’ regime (Agritrade 
2006).3 The banana trade dispute is an exemplary case when considering issues of 
free trade and managed trade. It raises the question as to what level the watchdog 
of free trade, the WTO, has become a playground for the large countries to pursue 
commercial and political rivalries with endless disputes (Josling in Josling and 
Taylor 2003).4 Furthermore, it may help to understand to what extent corporations, 
which are thought to evolve in a competitive environment, turn to the policy arena 
when they are in difficulties. 
The capital – environment war 
Most of the contributions reviewed here approach banana production predomi-
nantly from a historical, anthropological, economic, or political angle, and mostly 
locate causal factors of change in the social, economic, or political field. Only 
Soluri (in Striffler and Moberg 2003) and Striffler pay more substantial attention to 
the dynamics related to biophysical and technical factors. Panama disease played a 
key role during the first phase of large-scale banana production. The disease made 
control over vast areas of land necessary so that the companies could shift to new 
land once plantations, after a certain period of cultivation, had become infested by 
this disease and had to be abandoned. Companies also relocated to other countries. 
United Fruit purchased Hacienda Tenguel in 1934 because the Panama disease had 
not yet spread to Ecuador’s southern coast. The initially successful system of pa-
ternalism in Hacienda Tenguel collapsed when the Panama disease arrived in 
southern Ecuador. In this case political shifts were not generated sui generis, but 
followed ecological change. By the end of the 1950s, the Panama disease had be-
gun to seriously damage the plantations in Tenguel and to cut into company profits. 
More and more workers were laid off, and expenditures for fringe benefits (social 
clubs, health care, housing, and so on) were reduced. It was only then that the more 
authentic workers’ organization became stronger, as labourers left the social clubs 
and joined the union. Soon many of them, laid off and ordered to leave their 
houses, would adopt the newly emerging discourse of agrarian reform. 
 In the 1920s, United Fruit and Standard Fruit had already been looking for, and 
experimenting with, new varieties to replace the susceptible Gros Michel strain. 
Cavendish cultivars were identified as being more resistant to Panama disease but 
they bruised easily and were therefore difficult to transport. It would take until the 
late 1950s for the Cavendish to become an important variety. Transport systems 
had to be changed. Bananas were no longer shipped in bunches as with the Gros 
Michel, but packed as pre-cut hands in boxes, transported in refrigerated vessels 
and container transport, and ripened in the countries of consumption with ethylene 
(Soluri in Striffler and Moberg 2003). Standard Fruit (Dole) made the switch to 
Cavendish earlier and faster than United Fruit and subsequently succeeded to grow 
from a minor competitor into a significant rival of United Fruit within a decade 
(Taylor in Josling and Taylor 2003). Banana trading has become a logistically 
complex operation in which all the steps have to be carefully fine-tuned. 
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 In short, the Panama disease as well as the introduction of the Cavendish vari-
ety were environmental-technical factors shaping the economic and labour history 
of the banana sector. The impact of the introduction of the Cavendish, resistant to 
Panama disease, was enormous. Cavendish is much more productive; yields per 
hectare doubled within a few years after its introduction and continued to rise 
thereafter (Bucheli in Striffler and Moberg 2003). With the Cavendish, bananas 
could be cultivated on the same piece of land for almost an indefinite period and 
the ‘multinationals no longer needed the large quantities of reserve land that had 
made them such prominent political targets in the past’ (Striffler and Moberg 
2003,14). On the other hand, production became more labour intensive because of 
careful handling requirements, irrigation systems, and intensive pesticide spraying 
(although resistant to Panama disease, the Cavendish is susceptible to a range of 
other diseases). An even bigger problem has emerged with the appearance of black 
Sigatoka, a leaf spot disease that started to spread in Central America in the 1970s; 
it turned into an almost uncontrollable epidemic in the 1990s. 
 Even though these books devote little attention in analytical terms to the role of 
biophysical factors, they provide sufficient reading material to get an impression of 
how the efforts of growers to combat pest and diseases in banana monocultures are 
in themselves a battleground, which tends to have a significant impact on the other 
wars between capital and labour and between capital and capital. 
Can standards stop the wars? Re-designing the commodity chain 
In conflicts between capital and labour and between contract growers and fruit cor-
porations, quality standards are often presented as an apparently neutral referee that 
has to be obeyed. Moberg (in Striffler and Moberg 2003) gives examples of how in 
1919 the United Fruit Company controlled and regulated supply by domestic 
growers in Belize through creative use of quality standards. In fact, ever more ex-
acting standards laid the foundation for the expansion of the banana companies, 
since they made possible the long and hazardous journey of this perishable fruit. 
The banana companies began direct production on their own plantations in the late 
nineteenth century (instead of trading bananas sourced solely from independent 
growers) when they, due to increased demand, required large volumes of high-
quality produce (Striffler and Moberg). The Standard Fruit Company, a forerunner 
of Dole Food Company, referred with its name to their core value of strict adher-
ence to standards. Dole’s subsidiaries in Honduras and Costa Rica still have ‘Stan-
dard’ as part of their name. The strategic use of quality standards combined with 
price setting is a constant factor in the history of the export banana, and the con-
temporary redesign of agro-food chains keeps the banner of ‘quality’ standards in a 
central position. 
 A recent branch of the standard tree is formed by environmental standards (de-
veloped a few years ago as part of quality management systems). On the one hand, 
the threat of boycotts by European activists and highly publicized cases of pesti-
cide hazards in banana production and deforestation put pressure on the fruit cor-
porations in the early 1990s to change their environmental behaviour. On the other 
hand, new business interests in environmental issues in the context of the UNCED 
conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 provided a fruitful climate for consensus-
seeking environmentalist groups to enter into a dialogue with banana companies. 
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An early initiative to formulate new environmental standards came from the ‘Rain-
forest Alliance’, a USA-based nature conservation group. They developed a label-
ling programme for banana cultivation with the objective to reduce the negative 
impact of banana cultivation on tropical rainforests and biodiversity. Dole and Del 
Monte rejected the idea, but Chiquita joined with the Rainforest Alliance to de-
velop a set of criteria and procedures to certify banana plantations. The pragmatism 
of the Rainforest Alliance (‘So Practical, It’s Radical’ used to be their slogan) 
found fertile grounds at Chiquita, which could use the NGO-endorsement to refur-
bish their tarnished brand. Initially, the so-called Eco-OK certificate focussed on a 
set of six nature conservation and worker’s safety criteria. These were, in the per-
spective of the Rainforest Alliance, sufficiently strict to really make a difference, 
but at the same time practical and realistic (Wille cited in Jansen 2004). Taylor and 
Scharlin describe how the transformation of plantations to prepare them for certifi-
cation encountered many unforeseen technical problems and involved huge in-
vestments in infrastructure and training. Pesticide management systems needed 
complete revisions, packing stations were remodelled, recollection and disposal 
systems for plastic waste had to be developed, river banks replanted with forest 
trees, and so on. The Rainforest Alliance distanced itself from the anti-corporate 
movements and their demand for boycotts, and, instead, proclaimed to seek part-
nerships with corporations based on trust, transparency, involvement and consen-
sus. 
 In the description of Taylor and Scharlin, the Rainforest Alliance appears as a 
group of environmental cowboys opening up the Wild West of business-civil soci-
ety partnerships. ‘Smart Alliance, the main title of their book, refers to the field of 
business partnerships which generate, in manager parlance, ‘win-win situations’. 
The authors depict the many obstacles encountered on Chiquita’s road to corporate 
responsibility and typify Chiquita as a forerunner and trendsetter in environmental 
leadership. In the context of this essay the term ‘Smart Alliance’ has the connota-
tion of a military term. Indeed, in the perspective of the authors, the alliance seems 
to have pacified conflicts related to labour resistance, other capitalists (contract 
farmers, national producers represented by nationalist governments), or dangerous 
natural environments. But as common as it is in times of real or imagined wars, an 
alliance can only flourish by virtue of the presence of an enemy. The authors iden-
tify new front lines and oppositions in the banana arena, in particular between the 
Rainforest Alliance-Chiquita alliance and what they call the ‘anti-Americanism’ 
and ‘not-invented-here mindset’ of European NGOs that inspired, according to the 
authors, their negative stance towards the Eco-OK label and its successor, the Bet-
ter Banana Programme. By their making all kinds of short references, this view 
permeates the book.  
But like protesters worldwide these days, not all critics have motives of unal-
loyed virtue. As we will see, some of the most vocal protesters, especially in 
northern Europe, get funding from their governments for projects in Latin 
America. Others are simply business rivals in various garbs, who gain when 
Chiquita loses. The unavoidable contest between BBP and the European label-
ing schemes of Fair Trade and organic, and the U.K. Ethical Trading Initiative 
(ETI) was heating up. Oxfam and Christian Aid, among others, financed certain 
of those interests (Taylor and Scharlin, p. 38).  
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These observations, in which government funding and Oxfam’s support for Fair 
Trade with smallholders are supposedly reprehensible actions that should not be 
undertaken, are more insinuating than descriptive.5 
 The initial choice for the label name ‘Eco-OK’ turned out to be an unwise one. 
The EU had legally sanctioned any use of the term ‘eco’ on food labels except for 
organic produce. Hence, the Eco-OK banana, produced with almost conventional 
modes of pesticide and fertilizer use, could not be sold with that label in the lucra-
tive market of the European Union.6 Furthermore, international solidarity move-
ments made clear that the Eco-OK initiative was too concerned with environmental 
issues and neglected social issues such as the freedom of labour association. The 
Rainforest Alliance had to transform its initiative and formulated the Better Banana 
Programme.7 Local NGOs became involved in the monitoring of the banana pro-
ducers, and three additional criteria for certification that address social issues were 
added. However, as Taylor and Scharlin make clear, this did not temper the criti-
cism as outsiders classified the certification criteria as ‘too lax’ and the relationship 
between the Rainforest Alliance and the company it certifies as ‘too cosy’ (see also 
Jansen 2004). 
 It would need another actor on the battlefield to pacify the antagonism between 
the Rainforest Alliance certifications and the international organic farming move-
ment (represented by IFOAM – International Federation of Organic Agriculture 
Movements), the Fair Trade movement (FLO – Fairtrade Labelling Organizations) 
and organizations promoting social accountability certification. Recent years have 
seen a dramatic rise in the trade of organic and fair trade bananas and some authors 
consider this development as an opportunity for the survival of displaced ACP ba-
nana farmers, for example, the smallholders in the Windward Islands (Raynolds in 
Striffler and Moberg 2003). Those working on these ‘alternative markets’ looked 
critically at initiatives to make mainstream markets more sustainable. But when 
other public actors stepped in and the context changed, new consultations were 
held. FAO officials working on banana issues arranged the first meetings that 
would lead to the International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Label-
ling Alliance (iSEAL), an umbrella group of the aforementioned organizations. 
The group intends to ensure that their activities are in line with international norms 
and will not be more perceived as non-tariff barriers to trade (Taylor and Scharlin). 
The threat posed by the recent the WTO negotiations about free trade and non-
tariff barriers thus brought the quarrelling parties together. 
Standards and shifting conflicts in the banana commodity chain 
This essay has examined the diversity of conflicts that have been labelled as ‘Ba-
nana Wars’, and it follows from this exploration that old battlegrounds have not 
been entirely pacified even though new battlegrounds have been opening up. Old 
oppositions between capital and labour and between different forms of capital have 
been redefined by, and become embedded in, new emerging frontlines in the ba-
nana commodity chain, and thus are still present. Hence, for the interpretation of 
the current dynamics of the banana commodity chain, often represented in terms of 
environmental and quality standards, it would be good to absorb the historical 
works in order to understand how these ‘older’ contradictions can still influence 
the organization of production and social change. On the other hand, from the his-
torical works we cannot read how and why the current dynamics of the banana 
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commodity chain have evolved in a specific way. The contemporary form of the 
banana companies is not the Moloch idol that determines state formation. The ba-
nana republics are gone and the corporations have been transformed. History can-
not explain the most recent transformations, and yet they should, instead, be ex-
plained within the current political economic context. It is this terrain that makes 
the works of economists (Josling and Taylor, p. 111) on the recent trade conflict 
and the book by Taylor and Scharlin on the Rainforest Alliance so important. 
 What these books show together is the importance of setting standards. Stan-
dards were crucial in the past but have recently attained a more central place, con-
cretely as well as analytically. Standards appear as an apparently neutral tool to 
organize and define relationships and to pacify tensions in a range of processes: the 
restructuring of producer-consumer relationships, the shaping of contract farming 
(with its shift from permanent, unionized labour to the employment of temporary, 
unorganized labour), and the reluctance of states to regulate competition between 
forms of capitals and relationships between capital and labour. All of the Banana 
Wars discussed here involved a form of state intervention (by nation states or by 
that other public terrain, the WTO). If the arena shifts away from the state to an 
increased role of standard-setting by non-state actors, then it is likely that standards 
will no longer so easily appear as neutral tools, but instead standard-setting will in 
itself become politicized in the near future. 
* * * 
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Notes 
1. Women did not seem to mind the lack of employment opportunities and embraced, as their hus-
bands did, the middle class ideal of a family model based on a male breadwinner and female 
housewife. Outside the world of Tenguel such an ideal would have been unattainable for most peo-
ple. 
2. Fyffes, the fifth largest banana trader also used to be a subsidiary of the United Fruit Company, 
which traded basically from Caribbean countries. Fyffes was sold in the 1986 because the United 
Fruit Company, already restyled as Chiquita, wanted to focus on the promotion of its Chiquita 
brand. 
3. Although the fierce hostilities had ended, different conflicts had to be settled after 2001. Ecuador 
continued to object to the proposed new EU banana regime. Initial tariff-rates of € 230 per tonne 
were lowered to € 187, and had to be lowered again to € 176 due to a WTO ruling. It was still con-
sidered too high by Latin American producers and too low by ACP producers. In the meanwhile the 
Banana War had inflicted its casualties: the export of traditional Caribbean island suppliers (St Lu-
cia, St Vincent, Dominica, Grenada, and Jamaica) to the EU had fallen from 325,834 tonnes in 
1992 to 82,516 tonnes in 2004 (Agritrade 2006). It is quite likely that the Windward Islands banana 
industry will not survive the further liberalization of the EU market (Josling in Josling and Taylor 
2003). 
4. This does not mean that smaller countries do not turn to the WTO. The most recent Banana War 
turned into a WTO dispute is between the Philippines and Australia. This dispute revolves around 
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the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, since Australia uses quarantine issues to block the 
import of Philippine bananas (Fagan 2005). 
5. Though it has been published in the Agrarian Studies series of Yale University Press edited by 
James Scott, Taylor and Scharlin’s book is more a combination of a journalistic account and a par-
ticipant’s testimony than a scholarly book. Many observations are not documented, the data sources 
of data are often not mentioned, and the authors have a suggestive style of writing (to give one ex-
ample: ‘Early on, one academic said that Better Banana certification would never be credible [...]’. 
This raises questions as to who this academic was, where he or she said or wrote this, and so on). 
Their very pro-Chiquita/banana labelling stance is substantiated with very little data about the prac-
tices on the ground, and only supported indirectly by recalling various international voices who ex-
press that Chiquita has done ‘a great job’ (for example, see p. 99). The only ‘hard’ data mentioned 
are the pesticide reductions as listed by one of Chiquita’s managers (p. 102), but not corroborated 
by evidence, nor further reflected upon. As told in the book’s Preface, the second author had a posi-
tion on the Board of the Rainforest Alliance. The book sings, not surprisingly, the praises of the 
Better Banana Programme of the Rainforest Alliance.  
6. One could argue that this overlooking of EU regulation of organic farming parallels Chiquita’s 
erroneous assessment of how the licensing and quota system in the EU would evolve and not dis-
appear for quite some years. 
7. Taylor and Scharlin hardly discuss this transformation of Eco-OK into the Better Banana Pro-
gramme (it is only mentioned in two sentences in a footnote, note 3, p. 252) and instead suggest 
that it was one and the same activity. Typically, the term Eco-OK does not even appear in the index 
of the book. Similarly, the bankruptcy of Chiquita in 2001 is only marginally dealt with. These two 
deficiencies, in fact key to the object of their book, seem to make it easier for the authors to repre-
sent the recent history of the transformation of Chiquita under guidance of the Rainforest Alliance 
as an unambiguous success. 
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